

The New Post-Liberal Fascism – a Polish Perspective

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https://youtu.be/vV6_GGVd03k

For years, we have been frightened by a fascist wave sweeping across the Western world. But what we are actually dealing with is not one wave, but a head-on collision of two fascist waves, flowing from opposite ideological poles of the world of bourgeois politics. On one side, we have the old, well-known conservative and anti-immigrant fascism; on the other: a new post-liberal fascism: brutal chauvinism and militarism based on Russophobia (and in Germany, also on Palestinephobia). The new post-liberal fascism promotes, first, genocidal policies towards populations deemed hostile to the West, and second, the criminalization of (actual or perceived) allies of these populations in Western societies. These allies are, of course, branded as “traitors” and “agents” of Putin (or Hamas).

Marxists, I think, do not yet see the new post-liberal fascism; they do not understand that yesterday's liberals, yesterday's social democrats, and yesterday's greens are no longer liberals, social democrats, or greens, but fascists, still using the old liberal, social democratic, or green terminology. Post-liberal fascists themselves also do not understand that they have become fascists – they may think that they are simply militant defenders of liberal orthodoxy.

Post-liberal fascism comes under the banner of a false “anti-fascism.” The false “anti-fascism” describes the enemies of the West as fascists. This applies to both external enemies and internal enemies. The internal enemy is the old-school conservative fascists like Trump, the AFD, or Marine Le Pen. They are – in the narrative of false “anti-fascism” – agents or imitators of external fascists like Putin.

The use of the banner of false “anti-fascism” by the new fascists causes even Marxists to succumb to certain illusions and continue to believe in the existence of only one model of fascism, and therefore believe that liberals are still liberals, i.e., non-fascists (and perhaps even: anti-fascists). Many Marxists believe that the fight against fascism is simply a fight against the political forces defined as “far right,” and the worst of these Marxists believe that against fascism defined in this way, we should build a broad front with all the forces that do not want the “far right” to come to power.

The emergence of a completely new type of fascism imposes new theoretical tasks on us, the implementation of which should lead to specific practical conclusions.

However, I will focus solely on theoretical tasks. I would like to present to you my list of key theoretical questions and also share with you my “working” answers to these questions.

The first task is to rethink our definition of fascism and thus to draw the line between the essential features of fascism and its accidental features, related to narrower historical contexts.

The second task is to precisely grasp the difference between liberalism and post-liberal fascism, and thus also the difference between our critique of liberalism and our critique of post-liberal fascism.

The third task is to define the social base of the new variety of fascism.

The fourth task is to define the population whose destruction is the goal of the new variety of fascism.

The fifth task is to characterize the relationship between the new fascism and Western imperialism.

Task One: The Current Definition of Fascism

For a long time, we could believe that fascists had to be, first, opponents of the system that Marxists define as bourgeois democracy. For a long time, we could assume that fascists sought to establish a different form of capitalist state (imitating Adolf Hitler's Third Reich, Mussolini's Italy, or Franco's Spain). Second, fascists were associated with ethnic nationalism. Third, fascists were associated with conservatism (i.e., homophobia and male chauvinism). Today, however, we see that brutal militaristic chauvinism can function without these features.

Modern chauvinism does not need either ethnic nationalism or conservatism. Nor does it seek to change the form of the state. Instead of ethnic nationalism, it appeals to political nationalism, which claims that the ethnic origin of a citizen is not important. A legitimate member of the nation must first and foremost identify with the political and geopolitical line of the state and must accept state violence against internal and external enemies (defined by the state). If the state tells a citizen that the enemy of the nation or state is the Russians and their agents, the citizen must repeat that the enemy is the Russians and their agents. Such a citizen is a legitimate member of a given nation, even if he is gay or a member of some religious, ethnic, or racial minority. Moreover, such a citizen has the right to call “traitors” those members of the nation who oppose official state chauvinism – even if they are heterosexual representatives of a religious, ethnic, or racial majority. Such a citizen has the right to symbolically exclude them from the nation.

Modern militaristic chauvinism does not require the elimination of traditional political parties operating within the framework of so-called bourgeois democracy. These parties are moving to fascist positions and forming an alliance with each other, aimed at marginalizing (and then, perhaps, criminalizing) political forces that undermine the

chauvinistic and militaristic consensus. This consensus may also include old-style fascists, provided they identify with the prevailing variety of chauvinism, in particular with the geopolitical orientation of this chauvinism. We see this, for example, in Poland, where, despite a very sharp political struggle between post-liberal fascists (who are currently in power) and conservative fascists from Jarosław Kaczyński's party (who were in power until recently), both fascist camps are unanimously striving to exclude from political space those forces that question Poland's pro-Western and Russophobic political orientation. At the pan-European level, part of such a consensus is also, for example, the party of Giorgia Meloni, which undoubtedly represents old-style fascism.

So what is the essence of fascism? My answer has two elements. First, fascism is an ideology, which means that a fascist state is simply a state that proclaims fascist ideology. By saying that fascism is an ideology, I am saying that fascism is not a particular system of capitalist state, nor a particular model of capitalism, nor a particular model of relations between state, capital, and masses.

Second, fascist ideology is an anti-humanist ideology in a brutal, potentially genocidal form.

ANTI-HUMANISM (against the common good)		PSEUDO-HUMANISM (for the common good)	
PSEUDO-COLLECTIVISM	PSEUDO-INDIVIDUALISM	DEMOCRATIC PSEUDO-HUMANISM	CONSUMERIST PSEUDO-HUMANISM
Affirmation of the pseudo-community; the individual must serve his pseudo-community and fight against other pseudo-communities, „traitors”, and „outsiders.”	Affirmation of individual success achieved in the fight against other individuals.	Democracy = liberation of the individual	Material well-being = happiness

I need to explain what I mean by anti-humanist ideology. Pro-capitalist political parties can be arranged according to their distance from two axiological poles. The first is pseudo-humanism, the most popular variety of which is democratic pseudo-humanism. This is an ideology that advocates that all people should be liberated by bourgeois "democracy" and "human rights." This ideology rejects chauvinism, the struggle between people, and the struggle between nations. This ideology is advocated by liberals, social democrats, and greens. The second pole is anti-humanism. Anti-humanism rejects the peaceful cooperation of all people for their common good. According to anti-humanists, the struggle between people is a natural state, or even desirable. The most popular variety of anti-humanism is pseudo-collectivism, which claims that a person must be a "soldier" of his national pseudo-community in its fight against other pseudo-communities, defend its "purity," and expose "traitors" and "outsiders." Another variety of anti-humanism is pseudo-individualism, which affirms

the fight between individuals and encourages "strong" individuals to pursue their goals without taking into account the interests of "weak" individuals.

Although fascist ideology can be based on both pseudo-collectivism and pseudo-individualism, let us assume for the sake of simplicity that fascism is simply a brutal variant of pseudo-collectivism. Pseudo-individualist fascism also makes its presence felt in our times, but the two main varieties of contemporary fascism are pseudo-collectivist in nature. Old-style fascists are people who have always been pseudo-collectivists. On the other hand, new post-liberal fascists are people who were pseudo-humanists yesterday and today represent brutal anti-humanism in a pseudo-collectivist variant. They differ from old-style fascists in that they define the community they want to defend differently. Of course, this community (or rather pseudo-community) in both cases has two levels: national and general Western. Let us focus on the latter level, i.e., the "Western community." For conservative fascists, the "Western community" is the community of the "white man" or "Christian civilization." For post-liberal fascists, it is a community defined by the old pseudo-humanist language, i.e., the community of "democracy" and "human rights." The *connotation* of these terms becomes very unclear, but these terms still *denote* the socio-political system of the West. Since the current connotation of terms like "democracy" is a mystery, they actually function in the language of post-liberal fascists as *proper names* for the Western system. So the only indisputable answer to the question: what is democracy and what are human rights? is: democracy and human rights are what we have in the West. Post-liberal fascists prefer these names because of their pseudo-humanist past. By retaining these names, post-liberals can think that they are still liberals.

Task Two: The Difference Between Post-Liberal Fascism and Liberalism

We need to spend some time on the difference between post-liberal fascism and liberalism because it is a difference that most Marxists do not yet see. Marxism must be critical of both ideologies, but a Marxist critique of post-liberal fascism must be quite different from a Marxist critique of liberalism.

We can accuse liberalism of a contradiction between theory and practice, a contradiction between pseudo-humanist theory and anti-humanist practice. Liberals legitimize the anti-humanist social reality of capitalism and the criminal policies of imperialism, and thus legitimize many forms of violence and enslavement. But they legitimize all this with the help of a pseudo-humanist theory, which tells of the liberation of all people through "democracy" and "human rights." Marxists have always ridiculed the liberal critique of socialism from a "democratic" perspective. Today, however, we must state that this critique was ontologically false, but from a logical point of view, it was not absurd. Liberals used the idea of democracy to falsify reality—they falsely described the confrontation between capitalism and socialism as a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. But, although the connotation of the terms "democracy" and "totalitarianism" was rather vague in their language, liberals declaratively defended the right of various groups and individuals to oppose the policy of the state, both socialist and capitalist. They therefore declaratively defended so-called political

freedom. In short, the liberal theory was more or less coherent and free from fascist elements, but it did not describe any reality.

In the case of postliberal fascism, however, we are dealing with the opposite situation. This ideology is, unfortunately, generally true. Its main fascist element is in line with reality and actual practice. The chauvinistic language used against Russians and their allies, the intrusive propaganda for the militarization of Western societies, and the language of contempt for pacifists—all this adequately reflects the actual policies of Western countries. However, this ideology is not coherent. The liberal theory was coherent thanks to its complete detachment from reality, i.e., thanks to the contradiction between theory and reality. In the case of postliberal fascism, meanwhile, we are dealing with a contradiction within the theory itself, a contradiction within the language itself, a contradiction between the Goebbelsian component (i.e., the main component) and the postliberal component, i.e., the tradition to which the new fascism refers. Since the main component of postliberal fascism is true, it must contradict the terminology that postliberal fascists inherited from liberalism. Liberalism was, after all, just a humanist-sounding fairy tale. Of course, this less important component, the postliberal component, the language of “democracy” and “human rights,” contradicts not only the main component but also reality.

Our critique of postliberal fascism must point out both that its main fascist component is, unfortunately, true, and that its postliberal component is, unfortunately, false. Let us now look at this second issue, the contradiction between the postliberal component and reality.

We may doubt whether there is a contradiction here. Postliberal fascism inherited the terms from liberalism but rejected their liberal connotation. The current connotation of terms such as “democracy” or “human rights” remains a mystery, which means that these terms actually function as proper names of the Western system. It follows that the violation of human rights can be called “defense of human rights.” If we accept that “human rights” is just a proper name of the Western system, we must assume that “defense of human rights” is simply fighting the opponents of the West. Everything that the allies of the West do in the fight against the opponents of the West is “defense of human rights,” because “defense of human rights” is simply a fight for Western domination. To say that the West violates human rights is a statement burdened with a logical contradiction because “human rights” is simply something that is in the West or something that the West gives to its colonies. As we can see, the contradiction between the post-liberal element of contemporary fascism and reality disappears because it is simply logically impossible.

But this contradiction disappears only seemingly. Postliberal fascists are not the only users of the terms of liberal language. These terms are associated with certain ideas and emotions. These are completely different ideas and emotions than those to which Goebbels's language appeals. This contradiction does not disappear, and therefore must be mitigated in some way.

Namely, in the narrative of post-liberal fascism, two counter-tendencies clash: the chauvinist tendency and the revisionist tendency. The chauvinist tendency directly

expresses the main component of this ideology, the fascist component. The chauvinist tendency describes Russians and pro-Russian people as pathetic but at the same time dangerous subhumans who simply need to be exterminated or trained. This tendency adequately expresses the attitude of post-liberal fascists towards opponents of the West. The chauvinist tendency eliminates the liberal connotation of terms inherited from liberalism, reducing these terms to proper names.

The revisionist tendency, on the other hand, restores the liberal connotation of these terms. But this does not mean that post-liberal fascists appeal to the Ukrainian authorities to respect human rights. This only involves creating a parallel reality. Liberals were very good at this—they were able to talk about an anti-humanist reality in a very humanistic way. Their post-liberal successors inherited from them the ability to create a parallel reality. In a parallel reality, the inhabitants of Donbas are no longer subhumans who must be exterminated but victims of Russian fascist violence. Ukraine's mission is to liberate them. Ukraine is also fighting to save LGBT people, who are threatened by Putin's homophobic regime. Ukraine is fighting to save our planet from Russian eco-terrorism, to defend women's rights from Russian sexism, to defend workers' rights from brutal, oligarchic Russian capitalism. And so on and so forth.

The revisionist tendency also applies to the past. World War II was not a war in which the Red Army crushed fascism, but a war of two fascisms, Stalinist and Hitlerite, which jointly attacked the "free world" but at some point fell out with each other. The Ukrainian nationalists who fought against the Soviet Union in World War II were, in fact, antifascists fighting against Soviet fascism. And so on.

The revisionist tendency soothes the discomfort that people who were liberals yesterday and who have become Goebbels's disciples must feel. But the revisionist tendency cannot gain a clear advantage over the chauvinist tendency. Both tendencies must remain in balance with each other. After all, postliberal fascists want to transform the populations of Western societies into an army of tough and disciplined Western fighters. Pacifist attitudes and humanist sensibilities must be eradicated in the training process. And the training process is precisely chauvinist and militarist propaganda. The revisionist tendency is supposed to provide people with a sense of continuity between their past and present worldviews. But this tendency cannot drown out the chauvinist tendency because it is the chauvinist tendency that plays a key role in the political project of postliberal fascism.

Task Three: The Social Base of the New Fascism

The problem of the social base of fascism must be separated from the problem of whose interests fascism serves. We will discuss the question of interests served by fascism later when discussing the relationship between fascism and imperialism. At present, we are interested in the problem of which social group identifies most strongly with postliberal fascism. In my opinion, this group is the intelligentsia, but not all of it. Within the intelligentsia, there has long been an ideological division between the conservative intelligentsia, which defends national-religious traditions and creates a national mythology, and the so-called progressive intelligentsia, which advocates

modernization, the fight against backwardness, and cooperation with other nations. It is the so-called progressive intelligentsia that is the social subject of postliberal fascism.

The so-called progressive intelligentsia used to be a group that was actually progressive. In the 1940s, in connection with the victory of the Red Army over fascism and the prospect of building socialism in the backward countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a large part of the progressive intelligentsia, also in Poland, switched to pro-communist positions. Later, in the second half of the 1950s, the process of the so-called progressive intelligentsia switching from pro-communist positions to positions of pseudo-humanist anti-communism began. Currently, the so-called progressive intelligentsia is breaking away from pseudo-humanism and is becoming the main subject of post-liberal fascism. Although it is currently an extremely reactionary group, I will use the term "progressive intelligentsia" as a proper name, the denotation of which is obvious.

The progressive intelligentsia was fundamentally opposed to chauvinism when chauvinism took the form of anti-Semitism. In Poland, anti-Semitism was always directed against the progressive intelligentsia, as a cosmopolitan group alienated from the nation—a group, a large part of which were people of Jewish origin. In the last decades of the People's Republic of Poland, the progressive intelligentsia played a leading role within the anti-communist opposition. But a large part of this opposition was distrustful of it. Its representatives were not considered to be "true Poles" but descendants of Jewish communists. The situation of this group was therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, the progressive intelligentsia played a major role in Poland's political life; on the other hand, they had a strong sense of alienation from the Polish nation.

I think that today's Russophobic chauvinism satisfies an important need of the progressive intelligentsia. Russophobic chauvinism gives this group a sense of being rooted in the nation. The progressive intelligentsia, previously excluded from the group of "true Poles," today, thanks to Russophobia (which is its main dogma and political tool), itself defines who is a "true Pole" and who is an agent of Russia. The hatred of the progressive intelligentsia towards Russia is, in fact, a transformed hatred of the intelligentsia towards the popular masses. Political views that are unpopular in the progressive intelligentsia environment but popular among the popular masses are automatically defined by the progressive intelligentsia as pro-Russian views. The idea of the West dominating the East is, in fact, a transformed form of the idea of the political domination of the progressive intelligentsia over the backward popular masses.

I have stated earlier that the current connotation of the concept of democracy remains a mystery. Why is that? Well, because it is a connotation that is completely opposite to the etymology of the term "democracy" (people's power). The contradiction between the connotation and etymology of the concept of democracy exposes the hypocrisy of the intelligentsia, which is why this connotation should not be revealed to the general public. It can only be gently suggested. A form of such a subtle suggestion of the current connotation of the concept of democracy is to replace the term "democracy" with the more precise term "liberal democracy."

Let us reveal, however, what the current connotation of the concept of democracy is. Namely, democracy is the rule of the progressive intelligentsia over the people, the rule of a minority over the majority. The rule of the majority is populism; the rule of the minority is democracy. Of course, this connotation is much older than post-liberal fascism—it is a product of classical liberalism, but it is only post-liberal fascism that unabashedly proclaims that political opponents of the progressive intelligentsia must be brutally fought and stigmatized as enemies of democracy, i.e., agents of Russia. Democracy is therefore a brutal dictatorship of the progressive intelligentsia, defining opponents of the progressive intelligentsia as enemies of democracy. If we transfer the idea of democracy (understood in this way) to the level of international relations, we obtain the idea of the rule of the “enlightened” West over the “backward” East and South, the idea of political neutralization of the East and South.

For the progressive intelligentsia in Poland, Russophobia is a religion. This group does not act rationally. This is not about any material interests, I think, but about symbolic interests. First, the intelligentsia wants to unrestrainedly manifest its specific identity, an elite identity that distinguishes the progressive intelligentsia from ordinary people. Second, thanks to Russophobia, the intelligentsia gains a sense of power, a sense of agency, a sense of exercising hegemony in the ideological sphere. If the essence of the identity of a "true Pole" is anti-Semitism, the progressive intelligentsia is symbolically excluded from the Polish nation, even if it plays a key role in Polish political life. That is why the progressive intelligentsia dreams of replacing anti-Semitism with Russophobia. The progressive intelligentsia believes that thanks to this, it will no longer be an excluded group but a hegemonic group, i.e., a group deciding who is a "true Pole."

But the kind of power that the progressive intelligentsia dreams of has its price. The progressive intelligentsia must break with its liberal-pacifist worldview, which forbids dividing Poles into "true" and "untrue" and condemns chauvinistic and militaristic discourse. The progressive intelligentsia is therefore threatened with total disgrace in the eyes of the rest of the Polish nation. The rest of the nation sees that the same people who condemned chauvinism yesterday are today speaking the language of Goebbels. And that does not look good.

Task Four: The Population That Fascism Wants to Destroy

Fascism always has an external and internal enemy. The internal enemy is always linked to the external enemy. If we ignore the Palestinian-Israeli issue, which plays a major role in Germany but not in Central and Eastern Europe, the main external enemy of post-liberal fascism is Russia and the pro-Russian population, and the internal enemy is the political forces in Europe that question the policy of confrontation with Russia.

However, we need to take a close look at the population that post-liberal fascism treats as an external enemy. The question is: why is the pro-Russian population pro-Russian? And also: why does the West support the anti-Russian orientation of the current Ukrainian government? What is hidden behind this anti-Russianism?

The war that is commonly called the “war in Ukraine” is, in fact, a war that is taking place in Donbas, as well as in the areas called Novorossiia. Russia is defending the people of Donbas and Novorossiia, whom the Ukrainian state has tried to brutally Ukrainize. Are we dealing here with a conflict of two nationalisms: Ukrainian and Russian? Did the Russian Federation defend Russian nationalists, who were threatened by Ukrainian nationalism? It must be admitted that Russian nationalism, opposed to Putin, tried to play a certain role in this conflict and tried to build its political influence in Donbas and Novorossiia. But Russian nationalism does not adequately express the consciousness of the people of Donbas and Novorossiia. Let us emphasize this clearly: Russian nationalism is in conflict with both the political traditions of Donbas and Putin's political doctrine.

In fact, the people of Donbas and Novorossiia are part of a broader community that we should call the “Soviet nation.” The Soviet Union no longer exists. But people who identify with the Soviet tradition, with the cultural space of the former Soviet Union, still exist. The Soviet Union was a sum of national republics, but individual national republics included areas that were multinational and multicultural, such as the Donbas. Moreover, during the existence of the Soviet Union, the process of national consciousness being replaced by the all-Soviet consciousness took place in ethnically homogeneous areas as well. The historical event that radically strengthened the all-Soviet consciousness was the victory of the Red Army over fascism in World War II. It was a common victory of all nations and all ethnic groups of the Soviet Union.

This great victory of the multinational population of the Soviet Union is the source of the Soviet anti-fascist ethos. The anti-fascist ethos is hatred of fascism and its positive content: solidarity with all the anti-fascist forces of the world. We can also take this positive content more broadly, as a humanistic love for all of humanity, which is threatened by anti-human forces (with fascism at the forefront). Anti-fascism has become one of the key elements of the general Soviet consciousness. But the general Soviet consciousness contains another important element related to anti-fascism. This is anti-imperialism: hatred of imperialism and solidarity with all the peoples of the world fighting imperialism. Both of these elements are components of the Soviet internationalist ethos. For people brought up in the Soviet political tradition, there is nothing surprising in the fact that Western imperialists support Ukrainian fascists today. This confirms to the Soviet people of today the conviction that the banner of Soviet anti-fascism and anti-imperialism is still relevant and that it is the banner of truth. The natural reaction to an external threat seems to be nationalism aimed at external forces. But for the Soviet people, the natural reaction to such a threat is a revival of the Soviet internationalist ethos: an appeal for help to all the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist forces of the world.

The members of the Soviet nation are all those people for whom identification with a specific nation (e.g., with the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Moldovan, Kazakh nations) is weaker than identification with the great Soviet entity that defeated fascism and provided assistance to the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America fighting against colonialism and imperialism. Large concentrations of the Soviet nation exist today in Belarus, Donbas and Novorossiia, Ukraine, Transnistria, Moldova, etc. Donbas is, I believe, a special place because the ethos of Donbas was internationalist long before

World War II. The proletarian population of the multinational Donbas strongly identified with the proletarian tradition, which – as it were – replaced national traditions. Here, Russian was simply the language of the multinational proletariat, the language of the international proletarian revolution. Later, in connection with World War II and the fierce fighting in the Donbas with the Nazi army, this proletarian ethos merged with the general Soviet anti-fascist ethos.

For today's representatives of the Soviet people, the Russian Federation is the symbolic heir of the Soviet Union. Modern Soviet people believe that the Russian Federation has a moral obligation to act militarily in their defense. This puts the Russian capitalist state in a very unusual situation (for a capitalist state). But Russia is a special capitalist state—a state that does not consider anti-communism its state ideology. Yeltsin tried to win the support of Russians by relying on anti-communist sentiments, but his policy was a complete failure. Yeltsin's policy led to the complete discrediting of anti-communism in the eyes of Russians. Putin understood this very well, and that is why his state doctrine does not attack the Soviet tradition but tries to use it.

In 2022, Putin entered the war against Ukraine, defining it not as a war against the Ukrainian people, but as a war against the Ukrainian fascist regime. In this way, he indirectly defined the population of Donbas and Novorossiia not as the Russian people, but precisely as the anti-fascist Soviet people. Of course, there are also elements of Russian nationalism in Putin's discourse. However, the dominant element is the anti-fascist, pro-Soviet element. This is a big problem for the Russian nationalist right, which would like to interpret this war as an imperial war of the Russian people. This kind of right, referring to the traditions of tsarist Russia and the White Army, and therefore reluctant to refer to Soviet terminology and symbolism, tried to gain political influence in Donbas. It tried to transform Donbas into a stronghold of Russian nationalism and use this stronghold in the political fight against Putin. But it lost. Putin's interpretation of the conflict between Donbas and the nationalist Ukrainian state was much more in line with the Donbas ethos than the ideas propagated by nationalists such as Igor Girkin.

Donbas is very attached to the Soviet tradition, and even to two—partly contradictory—Soviet traditions. On the one hand, it is the tradition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. On the other hand, it is the tradition of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic, which unsuccessfully opposed the decision of Lenin and Stalin to include Donbas and the Krivoy Rog Basin in the Ukrainian republic. The historical policy of the modern Donbas People's Republics appreciates both of these traditions.

There can be no doubt that the strategic goal of post-liberal fascism is the destruction of the Soviet nation. The essence of Russophobia is Soviet phobia, or anti-communism. The policy of destroying the Soviet nation was initiated long before 2014 by liberals, who spent a lot of money on creating and popularizing Ukrainian national consciousness, based on Soviet phobia and love for the West. The liberals implemented this policy using relatively mild methods. But this policy led them to a strategic alliance with the Ukrainian neo-Nazi movement. The child of this marriage is the so-called Revolution of Dignity, and then post-liberal fascism, which continues the same policy using brutal, genocidal methods. In order to destroy the Soviet nation, post-liberal fascists are ready to sentence to death the entire male population of the Ukrainian nation. From their point

of view, there can be no greater catastrophe than peace. After all, peace means that the Soviet nation will survive.

The conflict between Donbas and Ukraine can be interpreted superficially as an ethnic conflict. Even with such a not very precise interpretation, we must stand on the side of Donbas; we must defend the right of the people of Donbas and Novorossiia to self-determination, i.e., to break away from nationalist Ukraine. But this is not an ordinary ethnic conflict. This is an ideological conflict. On one side, we have pro-Soviet anti-fascism and anti-imperialism; on the other—a mixture of elements from different ideological languages, the common basis of which is Soviet phobia, i.e., anti-communism. This war is a war for the survival of the Soviet people in Donbas and Novorossiia. The paradoxical result of this war is the renaissance of the Soviet people. If it were not for the aggressive attitude of the West towards the Soviet people, pro-Soviet consciousness would probably gradually die out. Currently, we are seeing the opposite. The Soviet tradition is becoming increasingly popular, including in Russia. Soviet consciousness is hostile to anti-communism, but it is not a revolutionary anti-capitalist consciousness at present. Nevertheless, I believe that the defense of the Soviet people is the moral duty of all Marxists. The Soviet people are the children of our revolution. We cannot betray them.

Task Five: Post-Liberal Fascism and Imperialism

In 2022, post-liberal fascism was the ideology of American imperialism, as well as the ideology of some countries in the eastern part of NATO, such as Poland and the Baltic Republics. Western European imperialism, French and German, was only in the process of transitioning from liberal ideology to post-liberal fascism. Now the situation has reversed. American imperialism, thanks to Trump, has turned towards conservative fascism, for which anti-Russian chauvinism is just one of many chauvinisms. On the other hand, French and German imperialism has become ideologically similar to American imperialism in the Joe Biden era. Western Europe today speaks the language of Poland, i.e., the language of post-liberal fascism. It was the American imperialists who imposed post-liberal fascism on Western Europe. But when Western Europe adopted this ideology, the United States rejected it.

Undoubtedly, post-liberal fascism is today the ideology of European imperialism. But does this mean that the policy of confrontation with Russia is a policy consistent with the interests of European capital? Not necessarily. What we see when analyzing the policies of the main European powers is not so much the subordination of policy towards Russia to the interests of European capital, but something opposite: the adaptation of the interests of European capital to the policy of confrontation with Russia.

Western Europe is changing its “business model”—in such a way that militaristic policy serves the interests of European capital, to compensate for losses resulting from limited access to cheap Russian energy resources. The policy of confrontation with Russia was probably imposed on Western Europe by the United States. The political leaders of European capital can no longer count on cheap resources from Russia—but they can count on benefits from the development of the arms industry, as well as from

the so-called reconstruction of Ukraine. A sudden turn towards a policy of cooperation with Russia would mean compromising the European elites. These elites would have to admit that everything that was said about Russia was one big nonsense and that European societies were consciously deceived by their political leaders. The elites would have to admit their geopolitical dependence, that their policy was dictated by Joe Biden. The only thing left for them to do is to change the interests of European capital—to fit the policy from which it is impossible to withdraw quickly.

But the attempt to adapt the interests of European capital to the policy of confrontation with Russia may lead to a great defeat. Perhaps Western Europe will be forced to quietly withdraw from its aggressive policy towards Russia. Perhaps this process has already begun. If it turns out that European capital must warm its relations with Russia, post-liberal fascism based on brutal Russophobia/Soviet phobia will become an ideology dangerous to European capital.

We can hypothesize that the main ideologists of post-liberal fascism do not think at all about the interests of capitalists from their own countries. The social base of post-liberal fascism is not the bourgeoisie, but a certain part of the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia does not have common economic interests. Its political thinking is not based on any material interests but on symbolic interests. These symbolic interests of the intelligentsia may be in conflict with the interests of capital. Let us note that in the new countries of the European Union, such as Poland, the intelligentsia does not identify itself with the interests of the capitalists of its own country at all. The intelligentsia in Poland identifies itself with the general interest of the West. The most publicly active part of the fascist progressive intelligentsia comprises people who receive money from Western countries, not from Polish capitalists. But this does not mean that these people think rationally about the interests of Western capital. They are only interested in the ideological hegemony of the West because they associate this hegemony with the hegemony of the intelligentsia over the masses – and this is what they want.

The Polish government is propagating the narrative of the fascist progressive intelligentsia, which demands the complete integration of Ukraine with the West. However, Ukraine's accession to the European Union would be a disaster for the Polish bourgeoisie. The Polish comprador bourgeoisie has no chance in an economic clash with the big capital of Ukrainian oligarchs. Ukrainian capitalists will eat Polish capitalists for breakfast. The Polish government probably understands this, which is why, in practice, its policy is not as "pro-Ukrainian" as the progressive intelligentsia demands. The Polish government can speak the language of the intelligentsia, but it must think about the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that post-liberal fascism is a phenomenon that is best seen from a Polish perspective. In Poland, the Goebbelsian component of post-liberal fascism occurs in its pure form, and in Poland, too, post-liberal fascism is proclaimed with the greatest fanaticism. The political leaders of post-liberal fascism from the countries of the old European Union, such as Ursula von der Leyen, Friedrich

Merz, and Emmanuel Macron, speak almost Polish today. The Polish progressive intelligentsia believes that the West is now listening to the voice of Poland. These people also believe that the conversion of the West to Russophobia was the mission of the Polish nation. And this is very interesting because the same people who strive for the complete ideological colonization of Poland by the West simultaneously believe that they are wiser than the West because the West is only now beginning to understand that the essence of European values is the pursuit of the complete elimination of the Soviet heritage. Post-liberal fascism in the countries of the old European Union has still not achieved the "purity" that it has in Poland. If you want to study this phenomenon – come to Poland, learn Polish!